Are all forms of knowledge equal? When we consider basic epistemologies our core assumptions form a baseline to judge between them. But how do we come to those baseline assumptions? Is reason any better than revelation? And who’s to say? In my reading on this subject some Christian apologists believe and have argued that ultimately every position is a faith position. This is something of a truism, mostly because any kind of certainty is elusive if not impossible.
The Reformed (Calvinist) tradition within Christianity has a unique take on basic assumptions called presuppositionalism. There is quite a bit to say about presuppositionalism, but for my purposes here I only want to concentrate on one aspect. In my mind presuppositionalism is a cornerstone of Reformed ideology (and make no mistake, this is an ideology). The unique function of presuppositional apologetics is not that it reduces all forms of knowledge to Revelation, but that it insulates Reformed epistemology from criticism. In a segment from the movie Collision pastor Doug Wilson speaks to Columbia University’s club of atheists and agnostics and during the talk states that people who base their epistemology on reason are only “opening up their Bible” to explain their system of knowledge. What he means by this is that any conclusion is already based in the premise (and he admits this as much for Revelation if you’re paying attention).
My problem with presuppositionalism falls squarely on this point. By reducing all forms of knowledge to Revelation (we can only know the truth of things because God shows us) any way to judge between epistemologies is eliminated. Furthermore, and this is the kicker, presuppositionalism has to borrow from other epistemologies in order to support it’s own reliability as a system. Let me explain. Suppose you meet someone and they want to explain everything we know by Revelation. If you asked them why they would undoubtedly tell you that the explanation starts with acknowledging certain truths about reality, but really they have to operate under the assumption that the reasons they give are intelligible and can be proved by reason. Indeed, why have the discussion in the first place if this wasn’t the case?
Presuppositionalism perpetrates the worst kind of intellectual sophistry. By sleight of hand it pretends to give the baseline for all thought, but really it negates all thought. How could one avoid the conclusion that presuppositionalism is nothing but fideism? When pushed on this point all the proponents of Reformed epistemology can say is that it has yet to be revealed to the infidel (Christian or otherwise). Yet they make the point from a locked, sound-proof room.
As an anecdote, here is a quote from The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, by John Frame, “Since, then, classical foundationalism is faulty, the evidentialist objection lacks force. There is no reason why belief in Christianity should not itself be “properly basic,” included in the “foundation” of our noetic structure. And if it is, then we are within our rights (epistemically permitted) to believe in Christianity without any evidence at all.” (Frame, pg. 387)
It is interesting that Frame inserts the noetic notion here. By definition the noetic effect of sin has compromised man’s ability to think cogently. How then, I wonder, does Frame and other presuppositionalists think they can argue for the position without it being tainted by the very noetic infection that undermines other epistemologies? In other words, how do they know they’re healthy and the others are sick? It’s kind of like an insane person who believes they are the only rational person around.
To build on this I would state that Frame advocates a theistic intrasigence when the basic presupposition of the Bible’s authority is challenged. This is because his system is built on the distinctive presuppositionalist assertion that since revelation is self-attesting it cannot withstand a challenge from an outside source. How he knows with certainty about the authenticity of this self-attestation without falling into fideism is unclear. But he does admit an out, “I would not want to characterize my belief in God as lacking reasons, for that would be to admit that my belief is groundless. (Frame, pg. 399)” What grounds, Mr. Frame? Can you tell me why you need them?
I also just want to point out one more thing. It is clear that this is an ideologically driven argument, not a theological one. Ideologies are built on consistency, in fact, ideologies thrive on internal consistency. Mr. Frame, among others, belongs to a recently invigorated Calvinist resurgence that has as it basis a neo-fundamentalist hermenutic. In other words: a biblicism of the kind that is near impossible to hold. It’s reactionary nature is clear from the rhetoric used by most of the movement’s best known proponents. Modernity, science, reason, and pluralism are all painted in the worst possible light and are made the enemies of Christianity. Something bordering hypocrisy is added by this movement’s use of C.S. Lewis as a stalwart opponent of modernity. Lewis believed in the errant nature of the Old Testament, modern cosmological facts regarding the age of the universe, and biological evolution. Yet one might think that Lewis had an office in Geneva after listening to Doug Wilson for an hour. The only reason I mention this is because it seems, at least to me, that proponents of biblicism try to give themselves a boost in credibility by claiming Lewis as a hero when he was the perfect example of a compromiser and even a heretic according to their own views.
Of course the shadow of fear looms big in the background when it comes to this debate. By starting with the epistemological question we get straight to the heart of the matter. Presuppositional Calvinists fear any sort of capitulation to another hermenutic because they known it leads away from their theology, and even more so from their ecclesiology (which I think has them more scared). Not only could a diverging view from the kind of biblicism they espouse lead to, perhaps, Rome; but it could also lead to a bitter admission that their “control” over Scripture is an illusion…
Faith and certainty are not mutually exclusive; I am quite certain of my faith.
How have you come to reject a revelational epistemology with such certainty?
I hope I didn’t miscommunicate anything, but I don’t think I made a case against revelation as much as I did against presuppositionalism. My overall point is that the presuppositional approach to epistemology is inconsistent. For example: Say an atheist and a theist get behind their podiums for a deabte. Before the moderator can introduce them the theist smacks his podium and yells at the atheist, “You lose!” The atheist, slightly shocked at the behavior (because he is there after all to debate the topic of God’s existence), then asks the theist why? The theist, following his presuppositional model says, “I don’t have to answer that! Furthermore, I don’t have to give you any justification whatsoever for my belief.” The atheist, now scratching his head starts to wonder why he showed up.
Aron, if you want to say that all every position is ultimately a faith position I certainly wouldn’t object. It’s just that some faith positions are better than others. A fancy fideism is still a fideism when you take it’s clothes off. I’m an evidentialist because I believe reason and faith (faith in revelatory knowledge) are meant to work together. Revelatory epistemology has limits because by it’s nature it has to be mediated through a few select individuals that cannot directly share their experience with someone else. Reason, on the other hand, comes through the empirical experience all men share through their senses. Knowledge gained through reason can be communicated on a higher, more universal level. Of course, there is the noetic notion still left to consider, but after it’s consideration we’re still left at square one. How do we know that our “noetic structure” has not led to presuppositionalism? Furthermore how does one argue for or justify presuppositionalism without appealing to reason to support it?
Quite the caricature of presuppositionalism, friend.
There is an ontological distinction between Creator and creature (Genesis 1:1), though man is made in God’s image (Gen 1). As with our being, so also with our knowledge: we exist and are to think in analogical relation to God. We may know some things that he knows, but we can never know them as he knows them (because we exist on an utterly different, and dependent, plane of being). We can know things truly though not comprehensively (Deut 29:29). Since all things are what they are and derive their meaning from their place in the plan of God, all these facts are pre-interpreted by God and in order to use our reason obediently we are to re-interpret them accordingly: we are to “think God’s thoughts after him.” These facts are also reveletory; all facts reveal God.
In Romans 1, Paul says just the opposite of what I think you’re saying above: we do share revelation with the unregenerate, but we don’t share reason. All men know God–the true God–from creation (Rom 1), providence (Acts 14:17), and conscience (Rom 2), but the unregenerate use their reason (with other faculties) to suppress that knowledge in unrighteousness (Rom 1). They interpret their “empirical experience” as unregenerate, and with an ultimate view of suppressing what all facts reveal. Reason is either obedient, or disobedient–never neutral.
(What I’ve done above is argue for / justify presuppositionalism by appealing to God’s revelation, not my own autonomous reason.)
When I speak to an unbeliever, I’m not arguing for presuppositionalism, I’m actually evangelizing. And the heart of that message is, repent and embrace the God you already know is there. It’s an apologetic method which is consistent with Scripture’s teaching about the Creator/creature distinction, man as imago dei, and accounts for man’s psychological rupture (suppressing what is clearly revealed) caused by willful sin. Evidentialism lets unbelievers off the hook for claiming the ultimacy of chance in principle, while inconsistently relying on the laws of logic (which are God’s) and groundless predication (groundless on their own terms) in the course of argumentation–which are the sole capital of those who acknowledge their proper source. We aren’t opposed to reason, but to the idea that reason is a source of knowledge, and to the idea that it is ultimate or even co-ordinate with revelation. Whereas human reason originates in the created (finite, dependent, contingent) realm, revelation originates in God (infinite, independent, absolute, eternal).
First, I think you and I would both be better served if we specify what type of revelation we’re talking about. I think, but feel free to correct me if I’m wrong, that we have general revelation in mind and not special revelation. But both may be in play here. Secondly, I humbly disagree. Evidentialism does no such thing, rather, it forces opponents into a choice: belief or disbelief. It is after evidence is supplied that reason can play it’s role. In my opinion the noetic effect of sin on man’s thinking is the suppression of reason.
Thirdly, and this is the crucial point. No one can prove revelation. I would simply point you to a few of my comments above. You cannot evangelize a person by telling him he must believe without a reason. It just seems to me like a fancy trick. It’s kind of like saying, “Let’s talk this out, but before we do I want you to agree with me on everything I say in principle.” If you go with the presuppositional route everything is conceded before the talking begins. But if you push presuppositionalists on this very point they have to revert to reason in order to justify their position.
Reason serves to confirm revelation with the aid of grace. Otherwise any revelation given (and revelation is always given) can only be experienced by the individual to whom it is given. If and when it is shared it always has to be taken on faith if reason is not applied to confirm it. This is why presuppositionalism is nothing more than an extravagant fideism. You mentioned Romans 1 and state that men use reason to suppress the truth. Again, and humbly, I think that’s a little backwards. It’s only when men see reason that they try to suppress it. Reason would only show the truth of revelation – men run from reason, and become unreasonable when presented with the truth. To say that men could use reason to suppress the truth is like saying you can use fire to cool down. It can’t be done.
Mike,
1. By referring to Romans 1:18-32, Romans 2:14-16, and Acts 14:15-17 I am referring to general revelation (creation, conscience, and providence, respectively). Psalm 19 expands on Romans 1 quite nicely.
Romans 1 clearly teaches that all men already have all the evidence they need to believe: we are encompassed about with irrefutable evidence of God’s existence–by creation and providence without, and by conscience and the imago Dei within. Even the faculty of reason is itself a revelation of God’s existence. Everything in creation reveals God. At no time has any human ever been without an overabundance of irrefutable evidence for the true God’s existence (except perhaps in the cases of those dying in infancy or the mentally handicapped). But what does unregenerate man do with this clear revelation of God? He “suppresses it in unrighteousness.” How? –that is, by what faculty? “They did not acknowledge him as God…” “They became darkened in their thinking…” “God gave them over to a debased mind…” “So they are without excuse [Gk., anapologia, without a reason or an argument].” Why didn’t they wish to acknowledge God? Because unregenerate man seeks automony, to “do what is right in his own eyes,” becuase he prefers darkness to light. In short, he knows God, but doesn’t WANT to worship him. His use of reason is willfully corrupted by his ethical disposition against God. Such is to be expected of God’s enemies, of those who are children of wrath by nature.
2. There is no such thing as neutrality. All facts are ‘caught’ in the ‘glove’ of one’s presuppositions; no matter what facts you may throw at the unbeliver, nor how many, he will catch them in his unbelief. It is his philosophy of fact that must be torn down on his own terms: he has no argument. We show him that his system fails, that it cannot account for the laws of logic, the uniformity of nature, the existence of matter or its orderly arrangement, the existence of personality, or even the very act of predication. Every argument will vascillate between irrationalisim (e.g., “We can’t really know the truth…”) and rationalism (“…but I know Christiam theism is false.”) As Van Til said, “…unless God is back of everything, we cannot find meaning in anything.” Only Christian theism provides the necessary preconditions of intelligibilty and argumentation. We tear down every lofty argument lifted up against the knowledge of God. Step 2 comes when we then present a positive argument for our views (i.e., evangelism) and pray that the Holy Spirit “may, perchance, grant them to see [read: embrace] the truth.” The act of interpretation (the use of reason) is an altogether ethical function of the mind.
3. Yes, this is the crucial point: Romans 1 reveals to us that we don’t need to prove (general) revelation. All men already know the truth, but suppress it in unrighteousness. They don’t need to be convinced of God’s existence; they need to be reminded of it and called to admit it and repent. Their faulty attempts to account for such things as the laws of logic, etc. must be exposed as inconsistent on their own terms. There is a call to repentence embedded in this “tearing down of arguments,” – namely, “repent from your suppression of the truth.” Again, noone employing the presuppositional method would ask anyone to believe without evidence–such a person doesn’t exist. On the contrary, reason does not confirm revelation: reason submits to revelation because man submits to God. (General) revelation is “experienced” by “all men,” and their proper response is to embrace and treasure their Creator. To borrow the image from Lewis, you sound as though man is on the judge’s bench and “God is in the Dock,” but it’s quite the reverse. We agree that men become unreasonable when presented with the truth: that’s the point of Romans 1 – they use their reason to deny what they know to be true. This is the psychosis of the sinner.
I’m not arguing here for a particular apologetic method per se; I’m arguing for a method consistent with our claims about God as ontologically distinct, about man as God’s image (resulting in analogical vs univocal or equivocal thought and predication), and about the absolute ethical antithesis that exists in priniple between believers and unbelievers, which conditions their use of the faculty of reason. Frankly, if one holds to creation ex nihilo and total depravity consistently, I don’t see how any other option but presuppotisionalism is open to him.
(Please forgive my verbosity.)
Aron
Your verbosity and insight are welcome. I think I see more of your point regarding epistemology and the nature of the ontological distinction between man and God. Objective knowledge is made possible only by acknowledging that distinction and “thinking God’s thoughts after him” since man is “analogical” to his Creator.
I am wondering, though I think I see yet more of your point, about your assertions in your first of three arguments. The use of terms and phrases like, “encompassing” and “irrefutable evidence” already presuppose that reason is at work to validate revelation. Since God is Spirit, and since no man has ever seen Him, we must come to the conclusion that a certain level of deduction is involved before suppression of the truth. I guess what I’m getting at is the experience. Without reason there is nothing but consciousness and it’s contents. I can see how the noetic concept affects the use of reason, but not how it precludes it as a starting point.
In man’s prelapsarian state everything was a priori – God walked with man in the garden. But in a postlapsarian world man’s experience is not with God directly, but only through the medium of creation that makes up the “irrefutable evidence.” Man may want to suppress the evidence, but the only way he can comprehend the evidence as such is subjecting by it to a faculty that only he can use. It says in Romans 1 that man has “clearly perceived” His existence yet choses to think contrary to what his perception, his reason, was telling him.
Unless man’s experience of God is direct I don’t see how the presuppositional model can be internally consistent. But if I understand you right, it may be that the imago Dei in man operates something like a software program that makes man aware of God in a way that makes his self-disclosure through “the things that have been made” automatic. I’d have to think more about it…
Mike,
That’s a fair way to put it. Self-consciousness and God-consciousness are simultaneous (Calvin, Institutes, I.i), and though perhaps caused or triggered by creation (internal or external), the knowledge of God is immediate, non-inferential, and not the of a discursive reasoning process. Van Til wrote, (Introduction to Systematic Theology [1974], p 72-73).
He is worth quoting at length on this point. He writes in The Defense of the Faith (2008 edition):
By his mere consciousness, man is simultaneously conscious also of God as his Creator. Clear, authoritative revelation of the true God is, as Van Til says above, and . (One thinks of Psalm 139!)
Blessings,
Aron